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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SANDRA SPRY, aka SANDRA 
CHLOPTISKY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20000244-CA 
Priority No. 10 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(d) U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is a Defendant in a criminal case entitled to a copy of 
her written complaint, and her taped testimony, given to the police 
department, in conjunction with an internal affairs complaint 
brought against the arresting officer in the incident for which she 
is charged? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion to 
Compel Discovery (R. 30-33) . On appeal, the appellate court 
accords no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions, but 
reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991) . 
2. Is the State entitled to blanket discovery against a 
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criminal Defendant, without a particularized showing of good cause, 
pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Memorandum 
in Opposition to States' Motion to Discover (R. 37-39). On appeal, 
the appellate court accords no deference to a trial court's legal 
conclusions, but reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of 
N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in relevant part, 
provides as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material of 
information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or codefendants; 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the 
defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as 
required by statute relating to alibi or insanity, and any 
other item of evidence which the Court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in 
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
§63-2-304 U.C.A. Protected Records. 
The following records are protected if properly classified by 
a governmental entity: 
(9) records created or maintained for civil, criminal or 
administrative enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for 
discipline, licensing, certification, or registration 
purposes, if release of the records: 
(a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with 
investigations undertaken for enforcement, discipline, 
licensing, certification, or registration purposes; 
(b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with 
audits, disciplinary, or enforcement proceedings; 
(c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a 
right to a fair trial or impartial hearing; 
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(d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the 
identity of a source who is not generally known outside 
of government and, in the case of a record compiled in 
the course of an investigation, disclose information 
furnished by a source not generally known outside of 
government if disclosure would compromise the source; or 
(e) reasonably could be expected to disclose 
investigative or audit techniques, procedures, policies, 
or orders not generally known outside of government if 
disclosure would interfere with enforcement or audit 
efforts; 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
Defendant appeals an Order denying her Motion to Compel 
Discovery in this matter, and granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Discovery. Motions for Discovery were heard by the Court on 
February 22, 2000. The Order denying Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Discovery and granting Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery was dated 
March 22, 2000. 
Statement of Facts 
On or about August 6, 1999, at around midnight, Defendant 
approached an automated teller machine at her bank, in an attempt 
to make a late night mortgage payment. A police officer parked 
across the street, observed her, and determined that she looked 
"suspicious". He crossed the street, asked her to explain her 
presence at this strange hour, and claimed to have observed an open 
container of alcoholic beverage in her open convertible car. One 
thing led to another and the officer placed Defendant under arrest 
for interfering with his investigation. He then indicated he found 
a duffle bag in the back seat of the car containing a controlled 
substance and drug paraphernalia. The car was impounded, and 
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shortly thereafter destroyed by fire, while in the control of South 
Salt Lake police. 
Defendant, believing that she was roughed up and that her car 
was wrongfully destroyed, filed an internal affairs complaint 
against the officer and the backup officer assisting him. A 
hearing was held, which was taped. A determination was made by 
South Salt Lake police that there was no cause for the internal 
affairs complaint. 
Defendant requested a copy of her statements made as part of 
the internal affairs complaint, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing her to discover "relevant 
written or recorded statements of the Defendant or Co-Defendants". 
Defendant's general Request for Discovery was filed on November 1, 
1999 (R. 11-12) . When the State refused to produce the statements, 
Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (R. 30-33). 
Plaintiff filed a general Request for Discovery from 
Defendant, seeking addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of birth 
of all proposed witnesses for Defendant. Plaintiff also sought an 
opportunity to inspect any physical evidence, copies of any 
documents which Defendant intends to use at trial, and reports 
prepared by defense investigators (R. 43-45). 
The discovery issues were argued before the Court on February 
22, 2 000, resulting in a denial of Defendant's Motion to compel, 
and a granting of Plaintiff's discovery motion. The Order was 
entered on March 22, 2000; and Defendant filed her Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal with this Court on March 27, 2000. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant made a written Complaint against the arresting 
Officer in this incident, with the South Salt Lake City Internal 
Affairs Officer. She also made a taped statement as a result of 
the Internal Affairs investigation. The written and taped 
statements included details of her activities, as well as those of 
the Officer, before and during the incident resulting in these 
charges. Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, she is entitled to copies of all such written and 
recorded statements. Nothing contained in the Rules or the Utah 
Code prohibit her from obtaining the statements, which are 
necessary in order for her to prepare her defense. 
The State of Utah is not entitled to blanket discovery against 
her, as ordered by the Court. The Rules of discovery, and bodied 
by Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not grant 
such broad discovery right. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure considered additions to the Rule 
broadening discovery as requested herein, and refused to adopt such 
rule changes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A COPY OF HER PREVIOUS STATEMENT, MADE 
IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS COMPLAINT, AGAINST THE 
ARRESTING OFFICER. 
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Defendant in this action filed an internal affairs complaint 
against the officers who arrested her. A hearing was held, and a 
tape was made. A request was made by Defendant's civil attorney, 
of the City of South Salt Lake, for a copy of the original internal 
affairs complaint and the tape, which was denied. A copy of that 
denial is attached as Addendum B to this brief. The complaint and 
the tape are written and recorded statements of the Defendant in 
which she set forth her version of the facts of this case. 
Requests, under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
were also denied by the Prosecutor. Defendant is entitled to the 
written and recorded statements she made, in conjunction with this 
incident, pursuant to Rule 16(a) (1), to prepare her defense. 
The State maintains that the statement is a protected one 
under GRAMA and that only the officer and his attorney have access 
to this tape. If the State obtains a copy from the South Salt Lake 
City Attorney, they claim that they must not, under GRAMA, share it 
with defense counsel. 
This statement was made to the police, detailing the 
occurrences leading her to be arrested and charges to be filed. 
Obviously, it is "relevant". The Court, in its Order, denied the 
request and stated that: 
. . .the internal affairs complaint was not in conjunction 
with the arrest or this event. It is a whole separate event. 
It is not a part of the investigation or a product of the 
investigation. 
This is a statement which the police can and will use in 
preparing for trial. Defendant's counsel must be aware of the 
contents of the statement, in order to prepare. 
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In the City's reply to civil counsel's request for this same 
information under GRAMA, the City stated as follows: 
Your request for the internal affairs reports and statements 
are considered "private and protected" under the provisions of 
the Government Records Access and Management Act, Section 63-
2-101, et. seq. Specifically Sections 63-2-302 and Section 
63-2-304, U.C.A. 
The City's position on this appears to be self contradictory. 
Either the records are "private" or they are "protected". The 
categories are mutually exclusive. If the records are private, 
they must be disclosed to "the subject of the record". A complaint 
by a citizen against a policeman clearly has two subjects. The 
complaint is of an incident in which the criminal defendant came 
into contact with the offending police officer. The complaint, and 
the tape of the hearing, it can be assumed, detail the actions of 
both of the parties to the incident. Under §63-2-2(1)(a) U.C.A., 
Defendant is clearly entitled to a disclosure of this record, if 
the record is designated as private. 
The State, in the trial court, however, argued that the record 
was properly designated as protected. Though the State filed 
nothing in writing detailing their contention, it appears that 
their argument concentrates on §63-2-304(9). That section protects 
against discovery of records kept for administrative enforcement 
purposes, or for discipline. It would appear that the records of 
the internal affairs complaint may come under this protection. The 
protection, however, is conditional. The records are only 
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protected if they meet any of five criteria: (a) they might 
interfere with the investigation (b) they might interfere with 
disciplinary proceedings (c) they might deprive a person of a right 
to a fair trial or impartial hearing (d) they might disclose a 
source kept confidential by the government, or (e) they might 
disclose investigative or audit techniques. 
The complaint was written by Defendant; and the taped 
statement of Defendant was voluntarily given by her. No secret 
information is contained in either of these items. There are, 
however, details of the incident, remembered shortly after the 
incident occurred, which might assist in presenting a defense. No 
prejudice can occur to the arresting officer, as the internal 
affairs complaint has been dismissed as unsubstantiated. Thus, 
none of the conditions specified by statue as justifying the 
protection of these records, have been met. 
The statements almost certainly will assist in presenting the 
State's case. Pursuant to §63-2-206 U.C.A. one government agency 
is allowed to provide a protected record to another government 
agency if the second agency: 
Enforces litigates, or investigates civil, criminal, or 
administrative law, and the record is necessary to a 
proceeding or investigation; 
It is obvious that the State will have access to these 
statements made by Defendant, if they so choose In the trial 
court, the State suggested that they did not intend to use such 
information against Defendant. The existence and availability of 
detailed statements by Defendant as to what occurred between her 
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and the police officer, however, are likely to be strong 
temptations. While Defendant may be able to control the 
introduction of such statements at trial, she certainly cannot 
control whether the prosecutor reviews them in her case 
preparation. Here we have a prosecutor who has been most 
aggressive about asking the Court for assistance in getting any 
known evidence which Defendant may have for her defense. Can that 
same prosecutor be trusted to avoid even looking at probative 
evidence which is easily within her grasp? 
The statements certainly are relevant written and recorded 
statements within the Rule 16. Nothing contained in the Government 
Records Access and Management Act prohibits Defendant's access. 
Therefore, the decision of the trial court in denying Defendant 
access to this information is without legal foundation. 
POINT II 
THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO BLANKET DISCOVERY OF DEFENDANT'S 
CASE, PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE. 
This is a criminal action in which discovery is governed by 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule sets 
particular things that "the accused may be required" to provide, 
including to appear in a lineup, to provide specimens of 
handwriting and to submit to certain physical examinations. 
Additionally, Rule 16(c) provides as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense 
shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required 
by statute relating to alibi or insanity, and any other item 
of evidence which the Court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
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prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
The State in this matter asked for names and addresses of 
witnesses, the right to inspect documents, investigator 
reports, and other items. None of this material is covered by 
the rule. The rule, of course, is flexible, allowing other 
items to be produced "on good cause shown". The State's 
Motion was defective under the rules, as it made no attempt to 
provide good cause. Nevertheless, the Court ruled in the 
State's favor: 
The State has filed a Motion for Discovery, to discover names 
of witnesses, proposed testimony, and also copies in advance 
of exhibits. Defendant contends that Section 77-35-16 (c) 
[sic] requires a showing of good cause for a grant of 
discovery due the State. It is the Court's opinion that it is 
good cause that Plaintiff's counsel is able to be prepared, to 
be ready to make a presentation, and get to the truth. No 
additional showing of good cause is necessary. Therefore, the 
State's Motion for Discovery is granted. 
That ruling is contrary to law. Defendant acknowledges that 
the District Court has broad discretion to grant or refuse 
discovery. See State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). This 
ruling, however, is not properly in exercise of that discretion, as 
it is without justification or reference to a specific situation. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in 1989. Prior to that time, rules of criminal 
procedure were set by the legislature. The Utah Supreme Court took 
over the rule making authority, adopting many of the previous 
statutes regarding criminal rules, verbatim. There have been no 
substantive changes to Rule 16 since its adoption, though there has 
been substantial discussion. In a meeting of the Supreme Court 
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Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, proposed 
amendments to the rule were introduced by the Statewide Association 
of Public Attorneys of Utah. Minutes of several meetings of this 
committee are included with this brief as Addendum C. A 
subcommittee was created to study the proposals. The draft 
proposal bears the date of July 28, 1993. Under the proposal, 
defense counsel would be required to grant the kind of discovery 
that has been sought here by the prosecution. That would include 
the names and addresses of witnesses, together with written or 
recorded statements or existing memoranda of oral statements. 
Discovery would also include physical evidence, such as documents. 
Additionally, written notices of various defenses would be 
required. Present rules, of course, require that notice be given 
for an alibi defense and for an entrapment defense. Notice of 
expert witnesses must be given, pursuant to statute. The suggested 
changes, however, would give the State considerably more rights to 
discovery than have existed in Utah traditionally. 
The rule requiring more discovery, was discussed at some 
length at a meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, on 
February 14, 1994. The Minutes of the meeting refer to some of the 
highlights of the "very spirited discussion", referred to below. 
Changes in the rule were discussed again at a committee 
meeting held on March 14, 1994. On April 11, 1994, a draft 
proposal, including some additional changes, was passed on to the 
committee, and voted on. The Minutes of that meeting state that 
"the Motion carried unanimously." 
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Nevertheless, that action was not final. In the minutes of 
the Advisory Committee of May 8, 1995, it was reported that, after 
the draft rule was made and proposed, a number of comments were 
received. Objections came from the Attorney General's Office, as 
well as the Office of Legislative Counsel. The rule was sent back 
to the sub-committee for further recommendations. 
In a meeting of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, held on 
August 14, 1995, the committee voted to discontinue efforts to 
modify Rule 16. As far as can be determined, no substantial 
efforts have been made to modify this rule, since 1995. 
In effect, the motion for discovery filed by the State in this 
matter appears to be based on the proposed changes in Rule 16. The 
order granting that discovery seems to be based on the same 
premise. The problem, of course, is that the amendments were never 
made. While some sentiment existed, particularly among prosecuting 
attorneys, for a widened scope of discovery from the defense, the 
committee ended up being opposed to such changes. 
The Minutes of the meeting of February 14, 1994, refer to 
various concerns, especially among defense attorneys. Some of 
those statements are as follows: 
Brooke Wells believed that disclosing witnesses is as closely 
tied to disclosing defenses, as witnesses may also disclose 
defenses. She stated that disclosing defenses will help the 
prosection firm its case. She stated that this is a shifting 
of the burden onto the defense. She stated that the burden on 
defense counsel will be undo[sic], as prosecutors will always 
have more resources. Ms. Wells stated that most of her cases 
are won on reasonable doubt, and defense has no obligation to 
help with reasonable doubt. 
Mary Corporon noted that the system is not intended to lock 
people up, and it is designed to make the government overcome 
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significant burdens in order to prove its case. She also 
noted that the defense's case may not be set until trial, or 
until the prosecution rests its case. 
Todd Utzinger stated that he was having a problem with the 
distinction between alibi and other defenses and requested 
that someone in the committee attempt to provide him with an 
explanation. Mr. Utzinger also saw a concern in having police 
and go out and rattle witnesses who have been disclosed. 
Defendant concedes that some other states have required more 
discovery than has Utah; and she also concedes that there are 
arguments in favor of such changes in the Utah system. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee reviewed these 
changes, proposed some, reviewed the comments, and then abandoned 
the effort to amend the rule. The prosecutor in this matter, with 
the assistance of the Judge, has modified the rule independently, 
and without any of the safeguards of the rule making system. The 
Court, in making its finding that "It is good cause that 
Plaintiff's counsel be able to be prepared, to be ready to make a 
presentation, and to get to the truth" is no statement of good 
cause at all. What the trial court has done is accepted the 
proposed modifications, without going through the formalities. The 
rule making power is vested in the Supreme Court of this State, not 
in the individual District Courts. The rules are designed to be 
uniform, and clear and understandable to an attorney who practices 
in one county and travels across the county line to defend a client 
in another county. This counsel has practiced defense law since 
1973, and has never seen a unilateral rule change such as this in 
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any prior case. The trial court's order granting blanket discovery 
to the prosecution must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant is entitled to the written and recorded statements 
she gave while pursuing her Internal Affairs complaint against the 
arresting officer. The State's discovery request is too broad , 
and without a showing of good cause, and so cannot be granted as 
requested. / 
DATED this y day of August, 2000. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
^ 2 * * . 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellan 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the V day of August, 2000, I 
hand delivered two true and correct copies of Appellant's Brief to 
the office of Scott Keith Wilson, Assistant Utah Attorney, 160 East 
300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
fa £*JU 
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ADDENDUM 
Order denying Defendant's discovery and granting 
Plaintiff s discovery. 
Letter from South Salt Lake denying copies of Defendant's 
Internal Affairs Complaint and her taped statement. 
Minutes of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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ADDENDUM A 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. (2170) 
Attorney for Defendant 
895 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9635 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDRA M. SPRY 
aka SANDRA CHLOPITSKY 
ORDER 
Case No. 991919063 
Judge Burton Defendant. 
oooOooo 
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before Hon. Michael 
K. Burton, Judge of the above entitled Court, pursuant to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Discovers n~* * 
discovery, Defendant's Motion to Compel 
Discovery and Defendant's Motion for P ^ H ^ • 
l o n r o r
 Rendition of a Prisoner, on 
the 22nd day of February, 2000. Plaintiff was represented by 
Angela P. MiCclos and Defendant was represented by her attorney, W. 
Andrew McCullough. Court, being fully advised in the premises, 
makes and enters the following ORDER: 
1- The State has filed a Motion for Discovery, to discover 
names of witnesses, proposed testimony, and also copies in advance 
of exhibits. Defendant contends that Section „ « ,«, , 
a L
 section 77-35-16(c) requires 
a showing of good cause for a aram- ^ * • 
t,e ror a grant of discovery due the State. It 
is the Court's opinion that it is good cause that Plaintiff's 
counsel is able to be prepared, to be ready to make a presentation, 
and get to the truth. No additional showing of good cause is 
necessary. Therefore, the State's Motion for Discovery is granted. 
2. Defendant has requested the State to produce a copy of a 
tape recorded statement made by Defendant as part of an internal 
affairs complaint against the arresting officer in this matter. 
Defendant contends that this is a "recorded statement of Defendant" 
under the provisions of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and that it is discoverable as such. The State 
maintains that the statement is a protected one under GRAMA and 
that only the officer and his attorney have access to this tape. 
If the State obtains a copy from the South Salt Lake City Attorney, 
they must not, under GRAMA, share it with defense counsel. 
The Internal Affairs complaint was not in conjunction with the 
arrest or this event. It is a whole separate event. It is not 
part of the investigation or a product of the investigation. 
Therefore, Defendant's request is denied. 
3. The State has expressed no objection to providing 
Defendant with the video tape of Defendant's burning automobile. 
That will be produced by March 7, 2000. 
4. The State has not yet submitted the alleged controlled 
substance to the State crime lab for analysis. The State will do 
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so promptly, and will provide the results to Defendant -s counsel by 
April 4, 2000. 
5. The State has not objected to providing any evidence of 
fingerprints on the syringes allegedly taken from Defendant's 
possession. That information will be provided as soon as 
practicable. 
6. The State has made no objection to producing a complete 
inventory of what was taken from Defendant, as well as an inventory 
(to the best of their ability) of what was destroyed in the fire 
involving Defendant's vehicle. That information will be provided 
within two weeks of the date of this Order. 
7. Defendant has also moved for the Interstate Rendition of 
a prisoner being held currently in Elko County Jail, awaitxng 
felony sentencing in the State of Nevada. No objection being made 
by the State, the Court will
 i s s u e t h e c e r t i f i c a t e t o t h e 
appropriate authorities in the si-*t-« ^ „ 
xxi tne btate of Nevada to commence 
interstate Rendition. There being a question, however, of the 
trial date at this time, the Court will not sign such a certificate 
until a firm trial date has been set. A determination of who 
should bear costs, if any, is reserved for further proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CITY Or SOUTH SAWLAXE 
OTFICE OF 7H? CITY ATTORNEY PHONE (801) 483-6070 
HCRA1CHALL FAX (801) 483-6001 
OTY ATTORNEY 22° ^^TMORRIS AVENUE -SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84TT5-J284. 
April 19,200& 
Wayne Searie 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 233 
Midway, Utah-84049 
Re: Requested Lrfbrmatiotr 
Grama Request of Sandra Spry Chiopitsky 
EesriMr.Searic: 
thc^MoZ^l^Z0^"1:^2000>*&™* your requestformation. On 
C h i S y 0nr0inCi:rreCCTVcd ****!«* for Reconis" fcnr your client, SanteSpy 
active i ^ Z ^ * ? ? 0 ^ U ^ O U , r o m c e w « J ^ r e s P a a a t c r y o i ; 3 ! n c e t h ^ i 5 
y 0 r c i S r ChiopusKy. J wiB assume rhar you will transmit this information to 
events S f ? w ^  ° f *" ^  W B 0 1 * f a d f c a w ' l t a r * c r c « approximately 100 
o r ^ t o l d ^ H d U n D g ^ P e n i M f ° r i 9 " l° 2 0 0°- I a w a i t y « n - d m 5 a i i « t o whether 
Please let me know what your clients intentions arc. 
I am unaware of any "DEA" investigation of Mr. Carison. Fhave contacted hi* 
supervisor and various officials of the police department who are aiso unaware ofssch an event. 
I have no information regarding that matter. 
Your request for the internal affiurs reports and statements are considered "private and 
protected" under the provisions of the Government Records Access and Management Act, 
Section 63-2-101, et sea. specifically Sections 63-2-302 and Section 63-2-304, U.C.A. 
You have the right to appeal this denial to South Salt Lake City's Chief Administrative 
Officer. All notices of appeal must contain petitionee's name, mailing address, daytime 
telephone number, the relief south, along with any reasons or suppon for the appeal if desired. 
Notice nf an. intent to appeal must be sent within 30 days of the date of this letter. Appeals must 
be sent to the Mayor's Ofiicc; attn: Chief Administrator Office at 220 cast Morris Avenue, Suite 
440,Sdl \A»C\ty. \M* &U15. 
If you have any further questions, fed free to contact me. 
Sincerely Yours, 
South Siit Lake Cky Attorney 
Enc, 
HCH/taw 
ADDENDUM C 
MINUTES 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on tiie 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
14 June 1993 
Judicial Council Room, Administrative Office of the Courts 
Acting Chair, Kimberly Hornak 
Members Present: Members Excused: 
Judge David Young Judge Rodney Page 
Professor Lionel Frankel Philip R. Fishier 
David Schwendiman Judge Robin Reese 
Joan Watt Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Robert Stott Rodney Snow 
Ronald Fujino Brooke Wells 
David Thompson 
Guestsr 
Kim Christy Staff: 
James Housiey Mary T. Noonan 
1- Minutes- Robert Stott moved to approve the minutes of the 
5 May 199 3 meeting.- David Schwendiman seconded the motion. The 
motion carried unanimously. 
2~ Proposed Amendments, Rule 16 - James Housiey. Jim Housiey 
discussed proposed amendments to Rule 16, Discovery. (See 
attached). The amendments were submitted by the Statewide 
Association of Public Attorneys of Utah. Members of the committee 
made the following remarks: 
(a) Mr. Stott questioned whether the rule could result in a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing, pending receipt of 
discovery. Mr. Housiey expects that the rule will not affect the 
scheduling of a preliminary hearing. 
(b) Professor Frankel observed an ambiguity in section 
(b)(2). The clause " . . . , which the defendant intends to offer in 
evidence at the trial." appears to modify only the results rather 
than the entire examination, test, experiment or comparison. 
Professor Frankel also noted a discrepancy between sections (a) (3), 
reports of experts, and (b) (2) , reports of experts. Section (a) (3) 
appears broader in scope than (b) (2) . Mr. Housiey stated that the 
drafters intend the rule to include only evidence which will be 
offered at trial. 
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different from S ? ^ S t* t e d t h a t t h e Proposed rule is much 
riguirJments ^n ^ ^ era,^r,Ule' Particularly with respect to the 
arl'governea b? S In^hi', ? * feCti0n (b) (5) requirements 
that section (^ casela_w in the federal system. He also observed 
release Mr (H9 , U S a n c t x o n s ' d o e s not list revocation of pre-trial 
release. Mr. Housley responded that the omission is an oversight. 
that defense* i ? ^ q u e s t i o n e d whether it is practical to expect 
section(b). att°rneys can meet the deadlines established in 
listed^in sectian°?M?^ COminented that the breadth of defenses 
that thrul:\h ( n,^ ) ( ? L S t r o u b l e s o m e- Mr. Thompson suggested 
tnat the rule should only include affirmative defenses. 
the prooosafand l ^ * l^Z" t 0 C r e a t e a subcommittee to study 
SI S^S^nZ^^'J0*;**:* W l t h ™-dations Jt 
motion carried u n ^ o u ^ ' ^ ^ i ^ A ^ ^ ^ motion. The 
Mr stott snH D>-^-f==^  ty , ; Wel-Ls will chair the subcommittee. 
Mr. Stott and Professor Frankel will serve as members. 
that^otheV2 I S S r ^ I i ^ S 0 " - T h S R u l e 1 2 subcommittee reported 
motions r L a S ? ™ 11 tabl,lsh a time requirement (20 days) to file 
?llo2! such? moti^n.^ S ^ f l b i l i tY °* evidence. The Utah rule 
Stott made a moii on * f l i 6 d U P t 0 f i V e da^S b e f o r e trial. Mr' 
Stott furtheJ I v L JC°Tenudlng n° C h a n g e t o t h e U t a h ™le. Mr' 
motionsfcarrfed °n • d l s b a n d the Rule 12 subcommittee. The mucions carried unanimously. 
4. Adjourn. Ms. Hornak adjourned the meeting at 7:05 p.m. 
Minutes 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee an the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
14 February 1994 
Judicial Council Room, Administrative Office of the Courts 
Acting Chair, Philip R. Fishier 
Members Present Members Excused: 
Mary C. Corporon Ronald S. Fujino 
Professor Lionel H. Frankel Neil A. Kaplan 
Robert fC Heineman Judge Rodney S. Page 
Kimberly K. Hornak Judge Robin W. Reese 
Robert L Stott Rodney G. Snow 
Todd A. Utzinger Judge David S. Young 
Brooke C. Wells 
Staff: 
Brent M. Johnson 
1. Minutes. Brooke Wells moved to approve the minutes of the January 10 1994 
meeting, without a reading. Robert Stott seconded the motion. The motion carried 
unanimously. 
2. Report from the Rules 16 Subcommittee. Professor Frankel reported the 
findings and actions of the Rule 16 Subcommittee. Professor Frankel first noted the 
material differences between the proposed Rule 16 and the current Rule 16: 
(a) Paragraph (a)(1) goes further than the current Rule 4 by requiring 
addresses of witnesses, but the proposed rule does protect the victims by stating that 
victims addresses need not be published. 
(b) Paragraph (a)(2) adds all memoranda. 
(c) Paragraph (a)(3) goes beyond the present rule by adding all of the 
evidence to be produced at trial. 
(d) The main changes to the proposed rule, in section (b) in which the 
defendant is required to disclose witnesses and defenses and at an earlier date than 
required by the current rule. 
Professor Frankel noted that the subcommittee could not reach agreement on 
approving the proposed rule. Two of the three subcommittee members felt very 
strongly that the proposed rule would be too burdensome on defense attorneys, 
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particularly appointed counsel in rural areas. 
(A very spirited discussion on the merits of proposed Rule 16 ensued. Some of 
the highlights of that discussion follow.) 
Mr. Stott stated that the purpose of the proposed rule is to accelerate disclosure 
as ail other requested items will eventually be disclosed. He asked the committee 
members to look at the cited case law for evidence that the rule is not 
unconstitutional. He asked the committee members to put aside their prosecution 
versus defense differences and ask whether the rule will make the system of justice 
better. He stated that the idea of "ambush" is gone, and the rule will help get to the 
truth. Mr. Stott believed that the burden on defense counsel was overstated. 
Brooke Wells believed that disclosing witnesses is closely tied to disclosing 
defenses, as witnesses may also disclose defenses. She stated that disclosing - ^ 
defenses wiil help the prosecution firm ifs case. She stated that this is a shifting of - * 
the burden onto the defense. She stated that the burden on defense counsel wiil b e ^ ~ 
undo, as prosecutors wiil always have more resources. Ms. Weils stated that most o r?x_ 
her cases are won on reasonable doubt, and defense has no obligation to help with ) \ 
reasonable doubt Ms. Wells stated that she does not object to disclosing defenses, ^ 
such as aiibi or disclosing medical experts, but objects to many of the other 
disclosures. Ms. Wells also stated that, if the defense is required to disclose it's 
witnesses, police, who are agents of the prosecution, may exert undue powers ove* ' > 
the witnesses. She also noted that paragraph (3)(J) goes too far in allowing mental X ? 
examinations when mental capacity is not raised as a defense ^<^K 
Philip Fishier asked the committee why disclosing the defense of alibi is ^ V 
different from disclosing other defenses. Mr. Fishier framed the issue as: What is the 
system designed to do? Mr. Fishier also asked the committee what is the burden in 
having to disclose items ten days before trial, when the information will be disclosed 
eventually, noting that at sometime, a deadline must be placed. 
Professor Frankei noted that the defense of alibi involves time and place and if 
defense were required to only disclose at trial, the prosecutor would not have had time 
to check out the defense story. Professor Frankei noted that the argument for making 
the system of justice better would be more persuasive if prosecutors had made an 
appearance with the Legislature to speak out against problems with the victims' rights 
and other bills. Professor Frankei noted that the theory of expanding discovery is not 
a new idea, but has been around since the 1930s. He noted the abuses of discovery^*,; 
in civil actions which could also occur in criminal actions. Professor Frankei also \ ~ % -
noted that defense counsel may not know which witnesses or defenses they will use J > V ^ 
until the prosecution has rested it's case at trial. Professor Frankei did see a ^ \ 
^ \ -
V 
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difference between disclosure of witnesses and defenses, noting that a reasonable 
shortening of time for disclosure of witnesses might be O.K., but disclosure of 
defenses tells the prosecution if it has a good case. 
Mary Corporon noted that the system is not intended to lock people up, and it is 
designed to make the government overcome significant burdens in order to prove its 
case. She also noted that the defense's case may not be set until trial, or until the 
prosecution rests its case. 
Kimberiy Hornak stated that some defense attorneys currently play "hide t h e ^ ^ A ^ 
ball." She noted that some defense experts do not appear until the day of trial, which^S: 
does not allow the prosecution to prepare to rebut that witness. She sees a p rob len r r l ^S^ 
in some private attorneys who are paid more by their clients if they go to trial, and o ^ S ? 
therefore they are withholding evidence that could result in a dismissal, simply to be ^ 
paid more. Ms. Hornak noted that the federal government and other states were 
following the proposed rule. 
Todd Utzinger stated that he was having a problem with the distinction between 
alibi and other defenses and requested that someone in the committee attempt to 
provide him with an explanation. Mr. Utzinger also saw a concern in having police go 
out and rattle witnesses who have been disclosed. 
Mr. Fishier eventually noted that the discussion was fairly well split along 
prosecution and defense lines and he felt that it would be best to have ail committee 
members present, or provided an opportunity to be present, before taking a final vote 
on action. In the mean time, it was decided that the subcommittee would again meet, 
with Ms. Hornak being added as a member, to attempt to reach a compromise which 
might be more agreeable to the members. A motion was made to table the vote until 
the March 14 1994 meeting. Ms. Hornak seconded the motion. The motion carried 
unanimously. 
Because of time constraints, the revisitation of Rule 8 was not discussed. 
3. Adjourn. Ms. Corporon moved to adjourn the meeting at 7:00 pm. Mr. Stott 
seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
AGENDA 
SUPREME COURT'S ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
Monday, March 14, 1994-5:15 p.m. 
1. Welcome and Approval of February 14, 1994 Minutes Fishier 
2. Rule 16 Discussion Weils 
3. Letter from Lee FJlertson and Rule 21.5 Discussion Fishier 
4. Rule 8 Discussion W e i l s 
5. Adjourn 
Minutes 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 
U April L994 
Judicial Council Room, Administrative Office of the Courts 
Acting Chair, Philip R. Fishier 
Members Present: Members Excused: 
Mary C. Corporon Ronald S. Fujino 
Professor Lionel H. Frankei Judge Rodney S. Page 
Robert K. Heineman Robert L. Stott 
Kimberly K. Hornak Todd A. Utzinger 
Honorable Robin W. Reese 
Rodney G. Snow 
Brooke C. Wells Staff: 
Judge David S. Young Brent M. Johnson 
Honorable Christine M. Durham 
L While waiting for a full quorum to attend, Justice Christine Durham gave an overview 
of the Supreme Court's relationship with the committee. Justice Durham discussed the 
concerns the Supreme Court has with all of it's committees and the relationship of the rule 
making process to legislation and the Legislature. The Supreme Courtis concerned about the 
Legislature doing an end run around the Supreme Court's rule making process. Justice 
Durham explained the limits of the committee directly contacting the Legislature. Justice 
Durham stated that committee members must refrain from testifying, lobbying, letter writing 
and similar activities as members of the committee. Justice Durham stated that this does not 
preclude members from doing activities in an individual capacity, if it is clear that the person 
is not acting as a member of the committee. Committee members should contact the court 
when the committee or a committee member receives a request to testify, state an opinion or 
otherwise become involved in the legislative process. Justice Durham stated that she does 
read the minutes of committee meetings and will be prepared to answer any questions that 
committee members may have. 
2. Minutes. Professor Frankei moved to approve the minutes without a reading. Judge 
Young seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
3. Rule 16. Kim Hornak lead a discussion on the changes made by the subcommittee to 
the draft of Rule 16. Brooke Wells noted that there is a trend toward more disclosure in 
criminal proceedings and therefore there was compromise on both sides. 
Judge Robin Reese questioned whether there was a catch all provision in the rule 
requiring the prosecution to turn over evidence upon a showing of good cause by the defense. 
Robert Heineman noted that subsection (f)(1) covers those situations. Judge Reese noted that 
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subsection (f)(1) includes the standard "substantial need" rather than good cause. 
Judge Young asked the committee for it's opinion on the definition of "promptly." 
Professor Frankei noted that the rule should not discourage people from calling witnesses, 
simply because they did not notify promptly. Rodney Snow noted a concern about ineffective 
assistance of counsel being raised simply because a person did not call a witness. The 
committee agreed that promptly is an adequate word, which leaves sufficient discretion to 
judges. ^ c 
K 
Ms. Wells lead the discussion back to subsection (f)(1) concerning substantial need . ^ 
Mr. Snow noted that good cause is a lesser standard than substantial need. Professor Franke. 
moved to modify subsection (f) requiring that the prosecution show substantial need while 
defense need show only good cause. Mary Corporon seconded the motion. The motion 
earned, with Judge Young offering the only descending vote. 
Ms. Hornak then made a motion to approve Rule 16 as amended by the subcommittee ^ 
and the committee. Ms. Wells seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
4. Mr. Fishier lead the discussion on legislation to repeal Rule 21.5. A subcommittee 
was formed to further discuss the issue. The subcommittee was comprised of Robert 
Hememan and Todd Utzinger. Mr. Fishier instructed staff to prepare a letter to Lee 
Ellertson explaining that the committee is reviewing the legislation. 
5. Section 5 Rule 8. Ms. Wells lead a discussion on problems that her office is 
experiencing with Rule 8. Ms. Wells noted that persons are required to have capitol 
homicide experience, and her office is receiving many calls to second chair capitol cases. 
Her office does not feel comfortable having outside persons second chair these cases, because 
they must provide experience to their own people. Ms. Wells suggested a review of Rule 8 
to allow for qualification of persons, without excluding large groups of people. A 
subcommittee was formed to review the rule and make proposals to the committee. Ms. 
Wells will chair the committee with Ms. Corporon and Ms. Hornak also serving as members. 
6. Senate Bill 262. Mr. Fishier noted a request from Adult Probation and Parole to 
change Rule 22, to ailow 40 days for sentencing. The request was made based on recent 
legislation which requires AP&P to file presentence reports ten days before sentencing, rather 
than two. Mr. Snow noted that from his experience, the State presentence reports are terrible 
and there is a strong movement to have the writing of reports taken away from corrections. 
Ms. Wells noted that efficiency does need to improve, but the recent legislation will not 
provide improvement. Judge Young expressed an opinion that the committee should wait and 
see if AP&P is able to implement the new legislation, before changing the rule. Judge Young 
noted that if AP&P is unable to provide these reports within a quicker time frame, they 
should approach the governor to get more help. 
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Judge Reese moved to have this matter reviewed at the committee's September 1994 
meeting, after AP&P has had a chance to implement the legislation. Mary Corporon 
seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously. 
7. The meeting adjourned at 7:15 p.m. 
MINUTES 
SUPREME COURT ADVTSORT COMMXTTEE 
OH THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
230 South 500 East , S t e - 300 
Sal t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84102 
Monday, May 8, 1995 5:15 p.m. 
PRESENTr 
Judge David Roth, Chair 
William Daines 
Brian Florence 
Ronald Fujino 
Judge Robin Reese 
Brooke Wells 
Professor Lionel Frankel 
Professor Paul Cassell 
Robert Heineman 
Mary Corporon 
STAFF: 
EXCUSED: 
Juage David Young 
Judge Rodney Page 
Rodney Snow 
Robert Stott 
Brent: Johnson 
I. INTRODUCTION*: ^__ Judge David Roth welcomed the members to the 
meeting ana introduced the two new Committee members, William 
Daines and Brian Florence- Professor Paul Cassell moved to adopt 
the minutes of the March 13, 1995 meeting. Ron Fujino seconded the 
motion- The motion carried unanimously. 
II- RULE 8 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT: Brooke Wells provided the history 
of Rule a ana explained tne cnanges proposed by the subcommittee. 
The proposal deletes the word "capital" from paragraph (b) (2) and 
adds language to include persons who have negotiated a capital case 
been involved in the guilt phase of a capital case, or been 
involved in past conviction relief in a capital case. Ms. Wells 
stated that deleting the word "capital" will*'immediately qualify an 
additional nineteen attorneys. 
Judge Robin Reese questioned whether the trial of any homicide case 
will qualify, including a negligent homicide case. Ms. Wells 
stated that, as long as the attorney meets all of the other 
qualifications, a negligent homicide case would qualify. 
Robert Heineman stated that he has a concern with the educational 
experience requirement. He stated that the five year period should 
be shortened and perhaps an hourly figure included. Judge Roth 
questioned how difficult the current requirement is to comply with. 
Ms. Wells stated that persons in rural counties have a tough time 
as most courses are out-of-state and would require a minimum of 
$1500-00 for tuition, and: travel expenses• 
Professor Lionel Frankel proposed to add the words "felony 
homicide11 instead of "capital homicide." Professor Frankel stated 
that the uniqueness of a capital case is the emotion that is 
involved and he would like to see practitioners have experience 
with high stakes trials, rather than, simply a negligent homicide 
case. 
Mary Corporon stated that even a DDT case with death has unique 
issues that are relevant to capital cases and should not be 
excluded. These unique issues include dealing with an autopsy 
report, accident photos, ere. After brief discussion, Judge Roth 
questioned whether anyone wished to move for a change on the 
homicide issue- A change was not offered. 
The Committee discussed several possibilities on changing the 
education requirement. After a brief discussion and proposals, the 
Committee agreed that the Rule should be left as is. 
Judge Robin. Reese moved to adopt Rule 8 as proposed by the Rule 8 
subcommittee. Brian Florence seconded the motion. The motion 
carried unanimously. 
III. RULE IS SUBCOMMITTEE RESORT: Professor Lionel Frankel stated 
that the subcommittee ax a noc have a final proposal yet for the 
Committee, but Professor Frankel wished to provide some background 
on the Rule.. Professor Frankel stated that the Rule was drafted 
and proposed approximately one year ago- A number of comments were 
received questioning the Rule. The Attorney General and the Office 
of Legislative Counsel provided comment stating that the 
legislature had addressed related topics and the proposed Rule was 
inconsistent with legislative action.. Professor Frankel stated 
that the subcommittee will be addressing those inconsistencies in 
its proposal. Professor Frankel stated that the UACDL had two 
major comments: (l)they argue that the current Rule should not be 
changed as defense attorneys shouldn't be required to provide 
discovery; and (2)they object to certain specific language in the 
Rule. Professor Frankel stated that he and Robert Stott agree that 
the subcommittee will not revisit the basic essence of the Rule, 
although some changes will be proposed. 
Robert Heineman presented an opposing view from the subcommittee, 
stating that he sides with the UACDL and t-hat- t-he current Rul 
^hr^iH not- hp ait-p^ pd. Mr. Heineman stated under the current: rule, 
prosecution can obtain discovery from the defense if the 
prosecution needs it, but the provision is rarely used. Mr 
Heineman stated that discovery is not intended to be a lev^ e 
playing field, the prosecution must carry its burdens. **^?^ 
William Daines stated that reciprocal discovery already exists, i 
is just not codified. After a brief discussion, it was decided 
that further discussion of the Rule will be postponed until the 
subcommittee can make final recommendations. The Rule will be 
discussed at the July meeting* 
TT~ RULE 22r Professor Paul Cassell stated that he had reviewed 
recent: legislation, that may affect Rule 22 and victims rights. 
Professor Cassell stated that he did not perceive any changes that 
will be required because of legislation, although, he stated that 
the Committee may wish, to look: at the Rules in the future to 
incorporate language addressing victim impact. Judge Roth stated 
that the Committee will wait until there is a specific proposal 
before acting. 
v
- ADJOURN: There being no further business, the Committee 
meeting was adjourned at 6:50 p.m. 
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MINUTES 
SUPREME COURT ADVTSORT COMMITTEE: 
OK THE RULES OF CRIMINAL. PROCEDURE 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
230 South 500 East, Ste- 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Monday, August 14, 1995 
EXCUSED: 
Roaney Snow 
Prof. Lionel Frankel 
Prof. Paul Cassell 
William Daines 
Judge David Young 
PRESENT: 
Juage David Roth, Chair 
Robert Keineman 
Michael Wims 
Brooke Wells 
John O'Connell 
Brian Florence 
Mary Corporon 
STAFF: 
Brent Johnson 
I. INTRODUCTION: Judge David Roth welcomed the two members 
to the Committee- jonn O'Connell and Michael Wims then briefly 
introduced themselves to the Committee members and the Committee 
members similarly followed with brief introductions. A motion was 
made by Brian Florence to approve the minutes of the May 8, 1995 
meeting. Robert Heineman seconded the motion_ The motion carried 
unanimously-
ix. RULE 16": Robert Heineman resorted from the subcommittee 
concerning cnanges that were proposed to Rule 16. Mr. Heineman 
again seated that he felt that Rule 16 should not be amended. Mr. 
Heineman explained some of the subcommitteeTs proposals, including 
adding language stating that certain parts of the rule are subject 
to constitutional limitations. 
John O'Connell questioned whether there should be a definition of 
informant m the rule. He explained that caseiaw defines 
informant as confidential informants. Mr. O'Connell suggested 
adding language which would require disclosure where an informant's 
testimony would be relevant or material. 
Judge Roth stated that this would require disclosure of 99% of all 
informants. Mr. O'Connell stated that this is the- way matters 
should be. J 
Michael Wims stated that if there is a body of caseiaw on what 
constitutes an informant then the rule should be left the way it is 
proposea ana parties can use caseiaw to litigate whether a ^ person 
is an informant. 
Brian. Florence quest ioned t h e Committee as to whether a straw vote 
should be taken to determine whether amendments to Rule Iff should 
be pursued- Judge Roth ques t ioned the Committee as to why Rule Iff 
amendments were proposed i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . 
Brooke Wells s t a t e d t h a t the Committee was o r i g i n a l l y convinced 
t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e was going to t h r u s t r e c i p r o c a l discovery on 
l i t i g a n t s . The Committee f e l t t h a t i f i t addressed the i ssue 
f i r s t , i t could do a b e t t e r and l e s s excansive r u l e than the 
l e g i s l a t u r e Ms. Wells expla ined t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e has adopted 
provis ions for r ec ip roca l d i scovery of exoert wi tnesses , but has 
not addressed any other d iscovery i s s u e s . * 
* ? a V H ^ n e m a ? n 0 t i d t h a t the i e ? i s l a t u r e has been wai t ing to see ? „ a * t i l i S Committee would do with discovery before proceeding 
^ f „ e ^ l
 r-
 M r / I2** n o t e d t i l a t prosecutors a re no t cu r ren t ly 
™ 5 £ ? 2J* X ^ l s i a t l v e .changes on discovery, but are wai t ing t8 
see what th i s Committee does with the i s s u e / 
^ ? ? * 0 t V t a l e d t h a t i n 9 9 % o f a l i c a s e s ' d iscovery i s not a 
£n?£l ^irn ^ ^ d ?u <?9ested sending a ru l e to the Supreme 
^°
Ur
*"^*
refl
*
Cts the
 °
e s t
 e f f o r t s of the Committee, along with 
members ^ d i f f e r e n t pos i t i ons among Committee 
^ i ^ ^ J l n d U C Z e * f S ^ r a w v o t e o f t i l e a m b e r s . Five m e m b e r s ^ % 
?J *fS?° 3 H l ^ Y U i e 15 ^ ^ d m e n t s . One member, Mr. Wims voted + 
SL-EJlJ? ?d W i t i l amenoment p roposa l s . The Committee therefore G C d e S ^ 5 ^scoxl11i-nue Rule Iff e f f o r t s a t t h i s t ime. Staff was^ > 
S 5 S j f C 5 ? t 0 P r e ? a £ e a r e s o l u t i o n l e t t e r which w i l l be s e n t to the ^ -
f S S S S n S n^fYlnf Lt o f t i l e Committee's dec i s ion to ceaseM % 
S ^ S ? ? ? ° a t i l l s
 u
R u l e
- The Committee noted t h a t i f future ^ - ^ 
discuss ions r e V ^ W a r S r e c e i v e d ' t i i e Committee w i l l reopen V - ^ 
Z^'r^^ M J O m ? ! : , T h e r s b e ^ g no fur ther bus iness , the Committee 
adjourned at b : j j p.m. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 16. Discovery1 
(a) Disclosure bv the prosecutor-2 Upon written3 request of the defendant,, without order 
of the court, and if requested by the defendant,4 as soon as practicable following the filing of 
charges and before the arraignment, the prosecutor shall disclose and permit the defendant to 
inspect, copy, photograph, or test the following: 
(1) Witnesses: the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecutor intends to 
call as witnesses at a hearing or in his or her case in chief at the trial, together with 
relevant written or recorded statements or existing memoranda of any oral statements of 
such persons.5 Addresses of victims, who request that their addresses not be published, 
shall be provided only upon court order after finding that such disclosure is necessary 
The proposed amended Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure creates opportunities and obligations regarding 
discovery beyond those granted or required by the current rule. The proposed rule's purpose is to allow for discovery 
as broad as possible without impinging upon the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and without overburdening 
government. The principle of fairness underlies the proposed rule. Broad discovery will minimize the- potenuai for 
undue delay and unfair surprise to either party. Broad discovery will also enhance the search for truth by promoting the 
factfinding process. See m general: State v Stewarr. 139 Anz. 50, 676 P.2d 1108 (1984); State v. Davis, 63 Haw. 
191, 624-P.2d 375 (1981); People v Mahdi. 45 111. Dec. 318, 89 111. App. 937, 412 N.E. 2d 669 (1980); State v 
White. 430 So. 2d 171 (App.), wnt denied. 433 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1983). 
Subsection (a) was drafted to provide, as nearly as practical, the same provisions governing disclosure from the 
prosecutor as subsection (b) provides for the defendant to disclose. This subsection is intended to require as broad or 
broader disclosure by the prosecution than the existing Rule 16. 
Written request was added to provide documentation as to the nature and amount of discovery requested. The existing 
practice in the Third District Courts has been to make discovery requests m writing. 
The language "if requested by the defendant" was added to make it clear that there is no point in time that a requirement 
of automatic disclosure would kick m without the written request. 
Disclosure of the names and addresses of witnesses is pretty much standard procedure m the Third District Courts. The 
words in the first sentence of subsection (a)(1), "at a heanng or in his or her case in chief at the trial," were added to 
make sure that none of the sancuons would apply if rebuttal witnesses were called without pnor notice. Subsection (a)(1) 
does not require that statements be in writing or recorded or that memoranda of these statements be generated specially 
for discovery. See also footnote 19, infra. 
after balancing- the interests of the victim and the rights of the accused.* 
(2) Defendant" s statements: any relevant written or recorded statements or 
memoranda, of any oraL statements made by the defendant or codefendants/ 
(3) Reports of experts:8 any reports, evaluations, or statements of experts,, made in 
connection with the particular case which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at 
a hearing9 or in his or her case in chief at the trial,10 including results of physical or 
mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons. 
(4) Physical evidence:11 
(A) any books, papers, documents, diagrams, photographs, or tangible objects, 
or copies or portions thereof, which, the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence 
at a hearing or in his or her case in chief at the trial. 
(B) any physical evidence seized from the defendant regardless of whether the 
prosecutor intends to offer it in evidence at the trial.12 
(5) Criminal record: the defendant's criminal record.13 
6Tlie second sentence m subsecuon (a)(1) was added out of concerns raised by victims. Legislation and/or a 
constitutional amendment incorporating this protection to a witness is anticipated. 
7Subsection (a)(2) was taken from subsecuon (a)(1) of the existing Rule 16. 
See footnote 20, infra. 
^Tie language, "at a heanng," found m subsecuons (a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4)(A), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C), and (b)(2) 
is intended to make it clear that discovery applies for evidenuary heanng purposes as well as for tnai purposes. 
10See footnote 4, supra. 
See footnote 21, infra. 
l2Subsecuon (a)(4)(B) expands on the requirement in existing Rule 16 (a)(3) to make it clear that disclosure of everything 
seized from the defendant is required. 
I3Subsection (a)(5) was taken from Subsection (a)(2) of the exisung Rule 16. 
(6) Exculpatory evidencer evidence known to the prosecutor which: tends to negate 
or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment-14 
(b) Disclosure bv the defendant:15 Upon written request of the prosecutor, without order 
of the court,16 and, if requested by the prosecutor,17 within 30 days after the arraignment, but 
in no case later than 10 days before the hearing or trial:18 
(1) the defendant shall disclose to and permit the prosecutor to inspect, copy, 
photograph, or test the following: 
(A) Witnesses: the names and addresses of persons whom the defendant 
intends to call as wimesses at a. hearing or at the trial, together with relevant 
written or recorded statements or existing memoranda of any oral statements of 
Subsection (a)(6) was taken from Subsection (a)(4) of the existing Rule 16. 
1
 One of the- central purposes of the proposal to amend existing Rule 16(c) as reflected in 16(b) of this draft was to 
provide a rule which: 
a. mandated disclosure from the defendant to the prosecution upon the prosecutor's request (i.e. discovery rules 
and statutes from 14 states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Tdaho, Illinois. Indiana. Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York,, and Oregon) as opposed to requiring prior court order (i.e. discovery 
rules and statutes from 15 states including Utah's present Rule 16: Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin); and 
b. did not condition the prosecutor's opportunity for discovery upon discovery requests from the defendant (i.e. 
discovery rules and statutes from Instates: Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana. New Jersey, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia and Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 16, and the District of Columbia.) 
Procedural rules allowing for broad mutual discovery have widely been upheld as constitutional, simply 
requiring a defendant to disclose what he will shortiy reveal at a hearing or trial. Rules such as the present proposed 
Rule 16 at most accelerate the time certain evidence is disclosed. See Williams v. Rorida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970); State 
v. Nelson. 14 Wash. App. 65Z, 545 P.2d 36 (1975); Keilv v. Marion County. 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E. 2d 433 (1974); 
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Explanatory Note to Rule 16. 
16This portion of Subsection (b)(1)(B) is patterned after provisions in Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02, 
subd.l(l). 
I7See footnote 4, supra. 
time limit in subsection (b) is intended to maximize the usefulness of the defendant's disclosures to the prosecution. 
Flexibility is insured by subsection (d). The language is taken from New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
5-502(A). See also footnote 9, supra. 
sucfar person other thait the defendant^1* 
(B) Reports of experts:20 any reports, evaluations, or statements of experts, 
made in connection with: the particular case which the defendant intends to offer 
in evidence at a hearing or at the tnai, including* results of physical or mentaL 
examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons. 
(Q Physical evidence:21 any books, papers, documents, diagrams, 
photographs, or tangible objectsr or copies or portions thereof, which the 
Rules requiring a cnminai defendant to disclose the names, addresses* and statements of witnesses have largely been 
upheld as not violating the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination because such rules do not oblige disclosure 
of the defendant's own statements. See-People v Small. 631 P.2d 148, cert, denied 454 U.S. 1101 (1981); People v 
Larsen. 361 N.E.2d713 111. (App.), affirmed 385 N.E.2d. 679 (111.), cerr. denied 444 U.S. 908 (1977); State v Hardin. 
55B So.W.2d 804 (Mo. App. 1977); People v Damm. 24N.Y.2d. 256, 247 N.E.2d 651 (1969) 
Also, the act of handing over witnesses' names, addresses, and statements, as well as other evidence covered 
by the ruiet is not testimonial or communicative in nature and therefore does not violate the privilege. See Tmr^ a v 
Supenor Court.. 285 CaLRptr. 655, 133 Cal. App.Jd 670 (App. 4th Dist. 1991); People v Copicotto, 50 N-Y. 2d 222, 
428 N.Y.S.2d 649, 406 N.E.2d 465 (1980). See m general Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Application of 
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Sel f-Ihcnmination to Compulsory Production of Documents, 48 L.Ed 2d 852. 
Furthermore, broad discovery rules have been, widely held to not violate the work product privilege, the right 
to privacy, the right to effective assistance of counsel, and the attorney-client privilege. See United States v Nobles, 
422 U.S. 125 (1975); United States v Bump. 605 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979); People v" Small. 631 P.2d 148, cert 
denied 454U.S. 1101 (1981); People v Pike. 7LGai.2d 595, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672, 455 P.2d 776. cert, denied 406 U.S. 
971 (1972); People v Allen.. 104 Misc.2d 136, 42TN.Y.S.2d698 (1980). 
For similar provisions m other states see: Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02 subd.l(3)(b); 
Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(d)(i); Connecticut Superior Court Rules, §769(1); Missouri Rules of Court, Rule 
25.05(A)(2); New Mexico Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 5-502(A)(3); Anzona Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 
15.2(C)(lMz); California Penal Code § 1054.3(a); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in Cnminai Matters), § 135.835(1); 
and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule HI(A)(2). 
20Subsection (b)(1)(B) is patterned after provisions m the following states: Minnesota Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 
9.02 subd.l(2), Illinois Supreme Court Rules Rule 413(c); Connecticut Supenor Court Rules, §§769(2), 770; Missoun 
Rules of Court, Rule 25.05(A)(1); New Mexico Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 5-502(A)(2), (B); Anzona Rules of 
Cnminai Procedure, Rule 15.2(c)(2); Alabama Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 16.2(c); Maine Rules of Cnminai 
Procedure, Rule 16A(2); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(c)(2); New York Cnminai Procedure Law, §240.30(l)(a); 
California Penai Code, § 1054.3(a); Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(d)(2); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in 
Cnminai Matters), §135.835(2); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule 111(A)(4). 
21Subsection (b)(1)(C) is patterned after provisions in the following states: Minnesota Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 
9.02 subd.l(l); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(d)(ii); Connecticut Supenor Court Rules, §769; Missoun Rules 
of Court, Rule 25.05(A)(3); New Mexico Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 5-502(A)(l)(B); Anzona Rules of Cnminai 
Procedure, Rule 15.2(c)(3),(d); Alabama Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 16.2(a); Maine Rules of Cnminai Procedure, 
Rule 16A(a)(l); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(c)(1); New York Cnminai Procedure Law, §240.30(l)(b); California Penai 
Code § 1054.3(b); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure m Cnminai Matters), §135.835(3); and Indiana Municipal Coun 
Rules, Rule 111(a)(3). 
defendant intends to* offer in evidence at a. hearing' or at the triaL 
(2) Notice of Defenses:22 The defendant shall inform the prosecutor in writing3 
of ail defenses, mitigations,, and justifications, other than of not guilty or no contest, 
whick the defendant intends to assert at the trial, including but not limited to alibi, 
insanity, diminished capacity, self-defense, defense of others, defense of habitation, 
compulsion, consent, necessity, mistake of fact, mistaken identity, reliance on public 
authority, entrapment, voluntary termination, voluntary and involuntary intoxicationr 
impotency, extreme emotional disturbance, imperfect justification, and insufficiency of 
a prior conviction.24 The defendant shall supply the prosecutor with the names and 
addresses of persons whom the defendant intends to call as witnesses at the trial or 
hearing.23 
(3) The person of the accused:26 subsequent to the filing of the indictment or 
information, and upon written request of the prosecutor, the defendant shall, at the time 
and place designated hi the request: 
zThis pomon of Subsecaon (b)(2) was patterned aner provisions in Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02 
subd.l(3)(a). 
This portion of Subsection (b)(2) was patterned after provisions in the following states: Minnesota Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 9.02 subd.l(3)(a); Connecticut Supenor Court Rules, §758; and Anzona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 15.2(b). See also footnote 3, supra. 
provisions in other states providing for prosecution discovery of defenses see: Minnesota Rules of Cnminai 
Procedure, Rule 9.02 subd.l(3)(a); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rules 413(d) and (d)(iii); Connecticut Supenor Court 
Rules, §§757 et seq.„ 762 et seq.; Missoun Rules of Court, Rule 25.05(A)(4)-{5); Anzona Rules of Cnminai Procedure, 
Rule 15.2(b); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule 01(1). 
For comparable provisions in other states see: Minnesoca Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02 subd.l(3)(a); Illinois 
Supreme Coun Rules, Rule 413(d)(i); Missoun Rules of Court, Rule 25.05(A)(5); and Anzona Rules of Cnminai 
Procedure, Rule 15.2(b). See also footnote 9, supra. 
Subsection (b)(3) recodifies with some additions (see footnotes 27, 28, and 29, infra.) subsection (h) of the existing 
Rule 16. 
(A) appear in a: line-up;. 
(B) speak for identification by witnesses to an offense; 
(Q be fingerprinted, palmprinted, footprinted, orvoiceprinted; 
(D) pose for photographs not involving a re-enactment of a scene or event; 
(E) try on articles of clothing; 
(F) permit the taking of specimens of material, from under the defendant's 
fingernails;27 
(G) permit the taking of samples of the defendant's hair, blood, saliva, urine, 
and other specified materials which involve no unreasonable intrusions of the 
defendant's body; 
(H) permit the taking- of a dental impression;28 
(T) provide specimens of the defendant's handwriting; 
(J) submit to reasonable physical, medical, or mental29 examinations; 
(K) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Fingernail scrapings are added to the list of examinations which may be performed on the defendant contained in 
existing Rule 16(h) and is similar to provisions in the following states: Missouri Rules of Court, Rule 25.06(B)(7); 
Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16A(b)(2)(A)(vi); Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 9.02 
subd.2(l)(f); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(a)(vi); Connecticut Superior Court Rules §778(6); Arizona Rules 
of Criminai Procedure, Rule 15.2(a)(6); Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(b)(6); Maryland Court Rules, 
Rule 4-263(d)(l); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule m(B). 
28 
Dental impressions are added to the list of examinations, enumerated in existing Rule 16(h), which may be performed 
on a defendant. Proposed Rule 16(b)(3)(H) finds support in other states' provisions allowing for further reasonable 
physical inspections or examinations performed on a defendant in addition to those enumerated in existing Rule 16(h)(1)-
(9) and proposed Rule 16(b)(3)(A)-<G), (J)-<K). For examples see the following provisions: Minnesota Rules of 
Criminai Procedure, Rule 9.02 subd.2(l)(h); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(a)(ix); Connecticut Superior Court 
Rules, §778(10); Missouri Rules of Court, Rule 25.06(9); Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15.2(a)(8); 
Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(b)(8); Maine Rules of Criminai Procedure, Rule 16A(b)(2)(A)(ix); 
Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(d)(l); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule 111(B)(9). 
29 
Mental examinations are added to the list of examinations which may be performed on the defendant contained in 
existing Rule 16(h)(8) and is similar to provisions in Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(d)(i). 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing: purposes,, 
reasonable notice of the time and place of suck appearance shall be given by the 
prosecutor to the defendant and defense counsel. The defendant shall be entitled to the 
presence of counsel.30 Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with the 
requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, without reasonable 
excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence 
in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning 
the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should 
deem appropriate.31 
(c) Information not subject to disclosure:32 Except as to scientific or medical reports, 
this rule does not authorize the discovery and inspection of: 
(i) Work product:34 legal research or records, correspondence, reportsr 
memoranda, or internal documents, to the extent that they contain the mental 
sentence makes it clear that the defendant is entitled to the presence and assistance of counsel at any examination 
called forinSubsecuon (b)(3). For similar provisions in other states see: Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
9.02 subd.2(2); Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Rule 413(b); Connecticut Superior Court Rules §781(1); Arizona Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5.2(a); Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16A(b)(2)(B); and Indiana Municipal 
Court Rules, Rule 111(B). 
31This paragraph of Subsection (b)(3) is a recodification of the last paragraph of the existing Rule 16(h). For similar 
provisions in other states see: Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16A(c); and Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure 
in Criminal Matters), §135.865. 
32The inclusion of Subsection (c) is an attempt to codify and clarify some of the privileges and quasi privileges provided 
under other rules which have been the subject of some controversy in liugauon under exisung Rule 16. It is intended 
that some flexibility remains under this subsection since it is not intended to supersede excepaons contained in the 
separate rules govenung such privileges. It is anucipated that a party seeking a departure from these excepuons would 
proceed as provided under those rules and under subsecuon (f) of this proposed Rule 16. 
33For provisions from other states providing this exception to Subsecuon (c) see: Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
Rule 16.2(d); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(8); and Connecucut Superior Court Rules, §773. 
^See Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P. 
impressions^ conclusions^ opinions^ or legal theories: of respective counseL35 
(2) Defendant's statements:36 statements made by the defendant to the defendant's 
attorneys or the attorney's agent.37 
(3) Informants:3* an informant's identity, except where the informant will testify 
in the particular case. 
(d) Timing of request and disclosure:39 Upon motion and for good cause shown, the court 
may extend or shorten the time within which the parties must make the above disclosures. 
(e) Continuing duty to disclose:40 If, prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional 
evidence or material previously requested or ordered under the provisions of this rule, such party 
shall promptly notify the court and the opposing party of the existence of the additional evidence 
or material. 
(f) Court orders: 
Subsection (c)(1) may be somewhat narrower than the woric product exception in Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P. since it 
applies only to the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theones of counsel. For similar provisions ux 
other states see: Minnesota.Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 9.QZsubd.3; Connecticut Supenor Court Rules §773(1)-
(3); Missoun Rules of Court, Rule 25.10(A); New Mexico Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 5-502(c)(l); Alabama 
Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(d); Maine Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 16A(4); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 
16(f),(g); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in Cnminal Matters), §13S.855(l)(a); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, 
Rule IV(c)(l). 
36See Rule 504, U.R.E. 
It is intended that Subsection (c)(2) would be limited to attorneys' staff members including on-staff investigators and 
investigators specially hired or retained by the attorney to investigate the case under consideration. For similar provisions 
in other states see: New Mexico Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 5-502(c)(2); Alabama Rules of Cnminal Procedure, 
Rule 16.2(d); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(g); Califorma Penal Code, § 1054.3(a); Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure 
in Cnminal Matters), §135.335(1); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule 111(A)(2). See also footnote 19, supra. 
38See Rule 505, U.R.E. For similar provisions from other states see: Missoun Rules of Court, Rule 25.10(B); Oregon 
Revised Statutes (Procedure m Cnminal Matters), §135.855 (l)(b); and Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule IV(c)(2). 
See Alabama Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 16.2(a),(c). 
^Subsection (e) recodifies the last sentences of existing Rule 16(b) and (d) respectively. For similar provisions from 
other states see: Missoun Rules of Court, Rule 25.08; Alabama Rules of Cnminal Procedure, Rule 16.3; Maine Rules 
of Cnminal Procedure, Ruie 16A(a)(5); Idaho Court Rules, Rule 16(i); and Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(h). 
(1) Additional disclosures?41- Upon: motion by either party showing" substantial need: 
for relevant material, or information not subject to the above provisions and not otherwise 
obtainable,, and subject to constitutional limitations and privileges, the court in. its 
discretion may require the parties to disclose such, material, and information. 
(2) Protective orders:42 Either party may apply for a protective order for non-
disclosure of requested discovery. 
(3) Findings of fact and conclusions of law*43 The court, upon issuing an order 
under subsections (1) and (2) of this subsection, shall file written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
(g) Sanctions:4* If, at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from 
introducing" evidence not disclosed,, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 
circumstances^  
(h)45 The fact that a party has indicated an intention to offer specified evidence or call a 
Subsection (f)(1) is intended to give the court limited discretion to expand required disclosures beyond what is otherwise 
required-under Rule 16 without pnor intervention by the court. Subsection (f)(1) is intended to work in tandem with 
Subsection (f)(2) and would permit the court to appropnately protect such expanded disclosure or to seal, for appeal 
purposes, matenals submitted m camera should the court deny a motion to require disclosure. 
See footnote 41, supra. For similar provisions from other states see: Maine Rules of Cnminai Procedure, Rule 
16A(a)(6); Indiana Municipal Court Rules, Rule IV(E); Missoun Rules of Court, Rule 25.11; Idaho Court Rules, Rule 
16(k), Maryland Court Rules, Rule 4-263(i); and Oregon Revised Statutes (Procedure in Cnminai Matters), §135.373. 
43The requirement of findings and conclusions found m Subsection (f)(3) supplements Subsections (f)(1) and (2) and is 
intended to preserve discovery issues for appeal. 
^Subsection (g) is the existing Rule 16(g) verbatim. 
Subsection (h) is intended to prevent comment upon, or allusion to, the fact that a party provides discovery but does 
not use the disclosed matenals or witnesses at tnal. Under this subsection it would be inappropnate to let the jury know 
about it in any way. 
specified: wimess is not admissible in evidence at a. subsequent hearing- or trial-
(i)46 The requirements of this rule are in addition to alL other statutory requirements. 
Subsection (i) is intended to make it clear that this proposed Rule 16 does not supersede or preempt other statutory 
provisions. 
